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Motives of Non-Profit Organizations
and the Antitrust Laws
Frank J. Nawalanic*
Ar 1 1ST GLANCE, it would appear repugnant to equate or associate
non-profit organizations with the antitrust laws. This reaction stems
from a clash between the basic definition of a non-profit organization
-one that is not intended to and does not produce monetary gain ex-
cept as reasonable salaries paid employees for actual services ren-
dered-with the basic purpose of the antitrust laws: to insure com-
petitive business.2 On its face, a non-profit organization would hardly
be guilty of conspiring to restrain trade because its purpose is not so
oriented.
Yet non-profit organizations have recently demonstrated a rapid
growth into big business because of tax advantages afforded such or-
ganizations.3 Along with such growth, abuses of the non-profit status
also have occurred. 4 Simply put, some men are using altruistic form
to further their financial gain.
Non-profit status has traditionally been delegated and regulated
by state law. It is becoming increasingly clear that state law is ex-
panding the types of organization allowed non-profit status, thus in-
viting more abuses of the status to exist.5 This is exemplified by New
York's "Not-For-Profit Corporation Law" 6 and recent indications by
Pennsylvania and California legislators of their contemplation of en-
acting similar statutes.
It is with this understanding that the applicability of the antitrust
laws to non-profit corporations will be considered.
Development and Purpose of the Antitrust Laws
Any discussion of the antitrust laws is premised on the belief that
it is socially acceptable for an individual to compete in trade and com-
[Editor's Note: This paper, written for a seminar course on Non-Profit Organization Law
at C. S. U. College of Law early in 1971, will be the basic material to be contributed by
the writer as a chapter in the Third Edition of H. OLECK, NoN-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, etc.
(Prentice-Hall, Inc.) which is now in preparation.]
*B.M.E., Cleveland State University; J. D., June, 1971, Cleveland State University
College of Law; Member of the Ohio Bar; Associated with the law firm of Meyer,
Tilberry & Body (Cleveland).
1 H. Oleck, Non-Profit Uses and lbuses, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 207 , 211 (1970).
2 "The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of com-
petition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act,
Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to prevent."
FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 4.75-76 (1923).
See also, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U. S. 533, 559 (1944.).
3See, Po'wer Pools-Private Foundations, 13 U. C. L. A. L. REV. 938 (1966). Note that
the 1969 Tax Reform Act has somewhat curtailed such organizations by imposing a
4% tax on net investment income of private foundations.
4 Supra note 1 at 209.
5 H. Oleek, PROPRIETARY MENTALITY AND THE NEW NON-PROFIT CORPORATION LAWS, 20
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 145 (1971).
6 Chapter 37, CONSOL. LAWS OF N. Y. (McKinney 1970).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
21 CLEV. ST. L. R. (1)
merce for profit.7 However, engagement in trade is principally due to
selfishness and not selflessness.8 It naturally follows that the selfish
desire to engage in trade for profit would injure the public if left un-
checked. History shows that such basic considerations as these led the
ancient empires of Sumeria, Babylonia, Athens, and Rome to initiate
checks on competition to prevent destruction of competitors.9
In England and America, regulation of trade practices began to
develop under a common law doctrine. One author has divided the
trade practices regulated under common law into four areas: (1) un-
fair trade practices; (2) unfair competition; (3) unreasonable restraint
of trade and (4) combinations or agreements to monopolize.1 0
However, the common law proved to be incapable to handle the
competitive restraints of the 19th century, namely the trusts, pools,
and holding companies resulting and continuing from the large-scale
business ventures formed to feed and supply the armed forces during
the Civil War."- First, the common law did not develop as a uniform
body; and second, contracts in restraint of trade at common law were
unenforceable; they did not give rise to a civil cause of action and were
not criminally unlawful. 12
Also, state legislation proved only partially successful because the
interstate activities of the "trusts" were largely beyond the reach of
intrastate activity. 13 Further, some state legislation even facilitated
the growth of holding companies.14 It was in this background that the
Sherman Act came into existence.
Contrary to the views of at least one well-known authority,15 there
is both legislative' 6 and judicial' 7 support for the proposition that the
Sherman Act codified the common law, although in doing so it was
given a far broader reach than the common law prohibitions against
trade restraint.' 8
7 J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING TIlE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 (1970 ed.).
8W. & A. DURANT, THE LESSON OF HISTORY 54- (1968) ; J. VAN CisE, supra note 7 at 3:
by legislative acts such as the Homestead Act and constitutional rewards in the form
of limited monopolies to inventors and authors of original works, our government
implicitly accepts such premise as true.
9 J. VAN CISE, supra note 7 at 3.
10 V. KALINOWSKI, 16 Bus. ORG. ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION 1-39, § 1.03.
11 J. VAN CISE, supra note 7 at 14, 15. See also E. KINTER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 1-15
(1964).
12 V. KALINOWSKI, supra note 10 at 1-35.
13 J. VAN CISE, jupra note 7 at 15.
14 E. KINTER, supra note 11 at 10.
15 Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
16 See 21 CONG. REC. 1765 (1890).
17 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221, U. S. 1 (1911) ; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U. S. 469 (1940).
1 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) ; Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197 (1904) ; Cases cited note 17 supra.
Jan. 1972
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss1/12
ANTI-TRUST AND NON-PROFIT 90
An Approach to the Non-Profit
Organization - Antitrust Analysis
At common law, the purpose of the defendant organization was a
factor to be weighed in determining the legality of the trade restraint
asserted.19 Hence, the approach taken here with respect to non-profit
organizations will be to determine if the nature of such organizations
will result in an antitrust immunity or exemption and if so, to ascer-
tain to what extent the immunity or exemption exists. If no immunity
exists, it is assumed that the antitrust laws are equally applicable to
profit and non-profit organizations alike.
Antitrust Exemptions Relevant to Non-Profit Organizations.
According to this analysis, it is more logical to first set forth the
nature and extent of exemptions granted to certain characteristically
non-profit activities before applying antitrust "elements" by rote.
Noticeably absent from considerations are trade associations which
have been deleted for obvious reasons and publicly-regulated utility
companies which have been deleted because of the complex state and
federal laws governing such companies.
A. Statutory Exemptions
1.) Agricultural Cooperatives. Statutory antitrust exemptions for
agricultural cooperatives are found in
a.) Section 6 of the Clayton Act declaring that non-profit agricul-
tural organizations are not to be considered "illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade"; 20
b.) Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act (sometimes referred to
as the "Magna Carta" of cooperatives) authorizing persons engaged in
the production of agricultural products to act together in associations
with or without capital stock and to collectively process, prepare for
market, handle and market such products;2 '
c.) Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act authorizing the Secre-
tary of Agriculture to prohibit any agricultural association from
monopolizing or restraining trade.22
The policy underlying these exemptions is to permit the individual
farmer to compete effectively in the concentrated markets in which
he buys and sells 28 by organizing into cooperative associations which
may be non-profit or profit in nature.2 4 At the turn of the century, the
19 See Coons, Non-Commercial Pur#ose-Sherman Alct, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1962) ;
Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 1044 (1963).
21 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1963.
217 U. S. C. 9 291 (1964).
227 U. S. C. § 291, 292 (1964).
23 ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968, 208 (1968).
24 H. OLECK, NoN-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZA TIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS S60 (2nd ed.
1965).
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small farmer may well have been deserving of such special status, but
since the statutory exemption was passed, cooperatives have consider-
ably grown in size and number.25
Whatever the justification for such policy, three Supreme Court
decisions have interpreted the cooperative statutory exemption. The
first decision was rendered in United States v. Borden Co. 26 which set
forth the "Other Person's Rule" holding that the exemption to agri-
cultural cooperatives did not extend to combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade between an agricultural cooperative and others
who would not qualify as such. The second decision rendered in
Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United States27 held
that cooperatives could not engage in predatory trade practices. The
third Supreme Court decision, Smskist Growers, Inc. v Winckler & Smith
Citrus Products Co. 28 held that intra-enterprise conspiracy as applied
to three separate cooperatives having substantially the same members
were exempt from an antitrust violation despite allegations of con-
spiracy.
Hence, it appears settled that the antitrust exemption given the
agricultural cooperatives does not extend to predatory trade prac-
tices2 9 and that the power vested in the Secretary of Agriculture was
not of exclusive or primary jurisdiction.20 On the other hand, several
cases have held that because of the exemption, natural cooperative
association growth may proceed without limitation even to the point
of a total monopoly.3 1 The question of the statutory grant to employ
common marketing agents has not yet been decided.3 2
Of possible interest is a criticized district court case 3 permitting
price fixing, normally a per se violation, between two non-profit dairy
25 E. MacIntyre, Cooperatives, 26 A. B. A. ANTITUST SECrION 125, 126 (1964) C. f. J.
Noakes, Exemption for Cooperatives 19 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 407, 410 (1961).
26 308 U. S. 188 (1939). See also, Bergians Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers,
241 F. Supp. 476 (E. D. Mo. 1965).
27 362 U. S. 458 (1962). In the Maryland case a dairy cooperative attempted to purchase
a dairy distributor. The dairy cooperative controlled 80 to 85%7 of the milk produced in
the area. Held, that allegations of Sherman § 2 violation of illegal monopoly, that
allegations of Sherman § 1 violation of illegal conspiracy and that allegations of Clay-
ton § 7 violation of illegally acquiring dairy's business, all stated valid causes of action.
23370 U. S. 19 (1962).
29 Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n. v. Tillamook County Creamery Ass'n., 358 F. 2d 115
(9th Cir. 1966); April v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 168 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mass.
1958) ; United States v. King, 250 F. 908 (D. Mass. 1916) ; snpra note 27.
20 United States v. Dairy Co-op Ass'n., 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943) ; Cape Cod Food
Products v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 119 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass. 1954) ; Bergjans
Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E. D. Mo. 1965);
Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Ass'n. v. Tillamook Co. Cream Ass'n., 358 F. 2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1966).
31 Cape Cod Food Products v. National Cranberry Ass'n., 119 F. Supp. 900 (D. Mass.
1954) ; United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n., 167 F. Supp 45
(D. C. Cir. 1958), modified 362 U. S. 458 (1962).
32-Antitrust Developments, 1955-1968, supra note 23 at 210 notes that such practices have
received FTC approval subject to express limitations against predatory acts, unlawful
monopolization, acts in restraint of trade and undue enhancement of prices.
3United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D. C.
Cir. 1956).
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cooperatives. The court interpreted the statutes to arrive at this result,
and it is not clear to what extent, if any, the decision rested on the
fact that the alleged violators were non-profit associations.
2.) Labor Unions. In 1908, the Supreme Court in the Danbury
Hatters case 34 held that a boycott by labor organizations and their
members to compel unionization of the boycotted manufacturer
violated the Sherman Act. To counteract this decision, the Clayton
Act, when passed in 1914, contained two sections exempting labor
from certain antitrust prohibitions. The first section provided that
labor was not a "commodity or article of commerce" and the organ-
ization of labor shall not be a violation of antitrust laws. 35 The second
antitrust exemption basically prevented any restraining order or
injunction from issuing to prevent a labor dispute. 6 In 1932, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act broadened labor's exemption by expanding
the definition of a labor dispute37 and forbidding injunctions from
issuing in a wide variety of labor union activities.38
The Supreme Court in the Allen-Bradley case" held that the con-
gressional purpose of the Sherman Act in preserving and advancing
competition in a free market may at times conflict with the con-
gressional purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act preserving the rights
of labor to organize and better their working conditions through
collective bargaining.4 0 In United States v. Hutcheson.4 1 the Supreme
Court declared that the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts would have to be construed together to actively determine the
status of labor's exemption in the antitrust area. Hence, the "Allen-
Bradley doctrine" was formulated which held that a valid union
objective could violate the antitrust laws if the means used to accom-
plish the objectives were beyond the scope of labor's exemption. 42
As a result of such basic considerations, union activity restraining
competition might be found as violations of the antitrust laws where
the union:
a.) engages in violence or fraud which is intended to accomplish
a direct commercial restraint;
b.) engages in activity not considered a labor dispute;
54Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274 (1908).
35 U. S. C. § 17 (1963).
3629 U. S. C. § 52 (1965).
7279 U. S. C. § 113 (c) (1965).
3829 U. S. C. § 104- (1965).
39 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, 325 U. S. 797 (1944).
4°"We have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to
reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to pre-
serve the right of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of
collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities
under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other." Id. at 806.
41312 U. S. 219 (1941).
42 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, 325 U. S. 797 (1944). See also, Hunt v. Crumbach, 325 U. S. 821 (1945).
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c.) combines or conspires with a non-labor group to effect a
direct commercial restraint. 43
The law still remains in a state of flux insofar as standards are
established to guide labor's conduct. The split of opinion is demon-
strated in the United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.44 and in
Associated Food Retailers v. Jewel Tea Company 45 decisions. Both cases
were concerned with the basic collective bargaining agreement
effected between the union and the company. In both instances, the
majority opinion of three justices held that a labor union contract
could be a violation of the antitrust act; three other justices main-
tained that the negotiation and agreements reached in collective bar-
gaining afforded no consideration for an antitrust violation; and the
three concurring justices in the Pennington case held that an industry-
wide collective bargaining agreement violating the antitrust laws
was prima facie proof of such violation. Notwithstanding such dif-
ferences of opinion, it is reasonably concluded that the courts will
allow the introduction of the bargaining agreement and negotiations
as circumstantial evidence of an antitrust violation.46
A recent Supreme Court case of interest 47 concerned the standard
of proof applied in an antitrust case against labor unions. The majority
decision of five justices applied the usual "preponderance of the
evidence" standard of proof to an antitrust charge asserted against
a labor union. The four-justice dissent would apply the "clear proof"
requirement of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.48 to all ele-
ments of the union's antitrust violation, whereas the majority inter-
preted the statute to apply only to the union's action in authorizing
or ratifying the alleged unlawful contract.
3.) Non-Profit Institutions. In 1938, Congress specifically exempted
certain non-profit institutions from the price discrimination provisions
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 The legislation was prompted in good
part by a letter from the president of the Hospital Bureau of Standards
and Supplies calling attention to hospital supply bills increasing 20
43 Supra note 23 at 206.
44 Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 381 U. S. 657 (1965).
45 Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, 381 U. S. 761 (1965).
48 C. Fried & W. Crabtree, Labor 33 A. B. A. ANTITRUST SECTION 36 (1967).
47 Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 401 U. S. 302 (1971).
49 "No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organi-
zation participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable
in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members,
or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of,
such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual konwledge thereof." 29 U. S. C.
§ 106 (1965).
49 "Nothing in Sections 13-13b and 21a of this title, shall apply to purchases of their
supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches,
hospitals, and charitable institutions not operated for profit." 15 U. S. C. § 13c (1963).
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percent50 as a result of the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act
eliminating price discrimination. Both the Senate5 ' and the House
52
reasoned that a price discrimination exemption should apply to elee-
mosynary institutions.
Only three cases to date have considered the non-profit exemption.
In the General Shale Products case,53 the statute was construed as not
repealing price discrimination exemptions but adding to existing
exemptions because such exemptions were provided for after the
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. Hence, the court held that the
exemptions are specifically limited to those set forth in the non-profit
statute and the statute would not be construed otherwise. In Students
Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co.5 4 the court held that the non-
profit statute was not applicable in a price discrimination suit to sales
at a university campus bookstore because, "the books sold were not
for the use of the universities, but for resale at profit.15 5 Finally, in
Logan Lanes Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.56 the court came to grips with the
statute. In that case, summary judgment was granted dismissing a suit
brought by a private bowling alley against a manufacturer of bowling
equipment for discriminately selling similar equipment at a lower
price to a state university for use in the university's student union.
The reduced price sales allegedly resulted in the private bowling
concern having to charge higher prices for bowling than that charged
by the university. The court held that the non-profit institution act
prohibited maintenance of an antitrust action in this instance, stating
that:
a.) the antitrust exemption was not limited to just the non-profit
party (i.e., the purchaser) but also the seller, because every sale con-
summated has to have a seller and a buyer;
b.) interpreted the word "supplies" in the statute to include not
only stock materials and provisions needed to carry on daily operations,
50 "The 2,700 voluntary nonprofit hospitals of the country spend over 150 million dollars
a year on foodstuffs and supplies for the care of the needy sick, who would otherwise
be a burden on Federal, State and municipal institutions.
"Because of the charitable nature of their work many suppliers have hitherto allowed
these institutions special prices on their purchases. This the Robinson-Patman Act now
prohibits and as a consequence, hospital supply bills are increasing about 20 percent."
S. REp. No. 1769, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
31 "The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act, to prohibit price discrimination between
purchasers in interstate commerce where competition would thereby be lessened, does
not seem to apply as to eleemosynary institutions as they are not operated for profit.
The act does forbid such favors as might now be granted by sellers to such institu-
tions." S. REP. No. 1769, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
52 "The committee does not feel that the wholesome purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act
will be interferred with by the enactment of this bill to make certain that favors in
price which are occasionally extended to eleemosynary institutions, because of the char-
acter of the institution, do not fall under the ban of the act." H. R. REP. No. 2161, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
53 General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W. D. Ky.
1941), aff'd 132 F. 2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied 318 U. S. 780 (194-3).
51232 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U. S. 988 (1956).
55 Id at 51 n. 5.
56378 F. 2d 212 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U. S. 898 (1967).
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but also "embraces anything required to meet the institution's needs,
whether it is consumed or otherwise disposed of or, whether it con-
stitutes or becomes part of, a material object utilized to enable the
institution to carry on its activities"; 57
c.) the purpose of the exemption "was undoubtedly to permit
institutions which are not in business for a profit to operate as in-
expensively as possible"; 58
d.) even if the public were shown to have substantially used the
university's bowling lanes, the exemption would still be applicable
because the purchases of the bowling facilities were made by a non-
profit institution for its own use and this was sufficient to comply
with the statute;
e.) the facts showed a legitimate non-profit object of the uni-
versity was accomplished by the purchase of the bowling facility.
In summary, if the non-profit character of the organization is
compatibly coupled with the purchase of equipment which has some
direct relation or correlation with the organization's nonprofit pur-
pose, then a broad exemption to such organization under the Non-
Profit Institutions Act will be applied. 59 However, the holding that
the public trade could substantially use the organization's facilities
in direct competition with and to the detriment of a similar profit-
making organization may be suspect, and it is submitted that if such
facts ever do occur, the courts will rule that the purchase of such
equipment by the non-profit organization was not made for its own use.
B. Judicial Exemptions
1.) State and Federal Government Action. It should be obvious that
the Federal Government cannot be held to violate the antitrust laws.60
But the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 6' did not make such
conclusion obvious for state governmental action until Parker v.
Brown62 was decided in 1939. The Supreme Court held in the Parker
case that state government activities were not within the Sherman
Act prohibitions.6 3 This does not mean that states can authorize or
immunize violations of the Sherman Act by declaring such violations
57 Id at 216.
58 Id.
59 See also Annot., 3 A. L. R. Fed. 996 for discussion of non-profit price discrimination
exemption.
t5 U. S. v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 560 (1939).
6t U. S. CoNr., art. VI, § 2.
62Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
'3 "The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such and gives no hint that it was
intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id. at 351.
"The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agree-
ment and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly
but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit." Id. at 352.
Jan. 1972
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss1/12
ANTI-TRUST AND NON-PROFIT
lawful. 64 The state must actively regulate the business seeking anti-
trust immunity.
State regulation of business may be analogized to a broad spec-
trum with its middle occupied by those state-regulated businesses
whose policy is neutral or silent with respect to restraints of trade.
In such cases, there is no state antitrust immunity conferred.65 Cases
clearly falling within the exemption at the far end of the spectrum
must be:
a.) either created by the legislature or given government char-
acter and,
b.) directed and authorized by the same statute "to utilize anti-
competitive means to achieve a specific governmental purpose." 66
To be considered at all within that part of the spectrum granting
immunity, the entity or transaction must be mandated by legislative
enactment.
67
Currently, there are two unresolved issues under this exemption.
The first relates to an antitrust claim alleging that the state regulatory
board is nothing more than a "strawman" for other interests. 68 The
second relates to an antitrust claim alleging that public authorities are
part of the conspiracy; a situation not present in Parker.6 9
2.) Group Solicitation of Favorable Governmental Action. Related
to the above section on governmental immunity is the effect given to
conspiring businessmen procuring legislative or executive action fav-
orable to business activity under the assertion of political activity
'1 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 332, 344-347 (1903).
"No State can, by merely creating a corporation, or in any other mode, project its
authority into other States and across the continent, so as to prevent Congress from
exerting the power it possesses under the Constitution over interstate and international
commerce, or so as to exempt its corporation engaged in interstate commerce from
obedience to any rule lawfully established by Congress for such commerce," at 345.
See also Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) ; Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v.
FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959).
'1 George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F. 2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 850 (1970).
"The middle of the spectrum is occupied by cases in which the state has chosen to
regulate a field, but state policy is neutral or silent with respect to restraint of trade.
Since there is no conflict in such cases between state regulatory action and the policy of
unfettered competition the courts have found no difficulty in denying antitrust immun-
ity" at 31.
65 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Penn., 298 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (W. D.
Pa. 1969).
"7Id. at 1112. See also Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 313 F. Supp.
860 (M. D. Ga. 1970) and cases cited therein.
6' In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier, 361 F. 2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385
U. S. 930 (1966) the court found that North Carolina's insurance rating bureau was
actively supervised by the state and not challenged on appeal. The court then noted
that "absent congressional action departing from the rule of Parker v. Brown the North
Carolina statutory plan is clearly valid" at 872. Note that insurance regulation is spe-
cifically left to the states in § I of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1014
(1963). See also W. Bachelder, State-4pprosed Transactions, 33 A. B. A. ANTI-
TRUST L. J. 99, 103 (1967).
69 Harmon v. Valley National Bank of Arizona, 339 F. 2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964) (complaint
alleging that attorney general is co-conspirator not subject to dismissal) ; E. W. Wig-
Continued on next page)
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rights. 70 The question was decided by the Supreme Court in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 71 holding
that joint efforts by businessmen organized in a trade association to
procure favorable anticompetitive legislation was not a Sherman Act
violation. Rationale for the Eastern Railroad holding was that the
Sherman Act did not invade the area of legitimate political activity72
and to do so would encroach on the right of group petition, a freedom
appended to the Bill of Rights. 73 This doctrine was reiterated and
broadened in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,7 4 the court holding
that a union's actions in concert with large coal companies to influence
a public official to set minimum wages for government purchases of
coal was not an antitrust violation.
The lower courts have interpreted this exemption to cover such
situations as the bribing of a state official to use his position to impose
a trade restraint harmful to the plaintiff;75 where the conduct com-
plained of violates a valid state penal statute;76 or conduct giving rise
to a valid state cause of action.77 More recently, the doctrine has been
limited or eroded and exceptions to the rule have been found to apply
to instances where false information was submitted to government
(Continued from preceding page)
gins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Auth. 362 F. 2d 52, 56 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U. S. 947 (1966), state official carrying out official duties not subject to antitrust
violation); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 472 (D. C. Cir. 1970) (no con-
spiracy with Armory board because board is governmental agency and exempt).
70 In United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F. R. D. 510, 527 (D. Neb.
1945), this issue was considered with the court holding that group solicitation activities,
lawful in themselves under the first amendment of the Constitution, may become un-
lawful if done in concert within a broad scheme of conspiracy.
71Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127
(1961).
72,"To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative capacity
and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of
their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate,, not business
activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the
legislative history of that Act." Id. at 137.
73 "The right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires
with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend
upon their intent in doing so." Id. at 139.
See also dissent in United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 283 n. 1 (1967), saying that
the right of association is an extension of protection afforded by the First Amendment
and whether the right to associate is an independent First Amendment right is yet to
be decided.
74 United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965).
"Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or
as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act," at 670.
75 Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Ranger, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 at 400 (D. Idaho 1964),
aff'd, 351 F. 2d 851 (1965), rert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966).
76Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F. 2d 794- (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U. S. 944 (1961); Schenley Industries, Inc. v. N. J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers
Ass'n., 272 F. Supp. 872 (D. N. J. 1967).
77 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 483, 512 (1940) ; Parmelee Transportation
Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F. 2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 944 (1961);
Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Ranger, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd,
351 F. 2d 851 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 936 (1966).
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officials, 78 to efforts influencing the sale of products to public officials
acting under competitive bidding statutes,79 to efforts to utilize gov-
ernment powers conferred upon a private agency for illegal ends,80 and
to attempts to use illegal means to influence governmental officials.8 '
Nor will the doctrine be extended to cover judicial and administrative
adjucative proceedings.82
3.) The Professions.
a.) Professional Sports. In 1922, the Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball Club v. National League" held that baseball was exempt from
the antitrust laws. The exemption was affirmed in Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc.8 4 in 1953, and more recently (1971) in Salerno v.
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs.8 5 While granting an
exemption to baseball, the Supreme Court denied such exemptions
to boxing8 6 and football.87 Lower courts have refused to recognize
exemptions for professional basketball, 8 hockey,8 9 bowling, "0 and
golf.91
As a result of such decisions, a limited statutory exemption was
enacted in 196192 permitting the professional teams to pool their tele-
vision rights. Recently, the FCC has indicated that it will initiate an
investigation of practices conducted under this exemption. 91
Of interest only is the rationale underlying the baseball exemp-
tion. At least two theories are plausible. The one most commonly sub-
scribed to is that the court held baseball to be intrastate commerce and
therefore immune.94 However, in the Toolson and Radovich cases, the
78 Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 497 Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Reporter, A-I, D-1 (9th Cir. 1971).
79 George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F. 2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 850 (1970).
S°Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F. 2d 561 at 593 (10th Cir. 1961),
petition for cert. dismissed, 371 U. S. 801 (1962).
81 Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local
No. ISO, 505 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reporter A-1, (9th Cir. 1971).
s2 Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
83 Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922).
s4 Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 34-6 U. S. 356 (1953).
s5 Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 1970 Trade Cas. § 72, 996
(S. D. N. Y. 1969), aff'd 1970 Trade Cas. § 73, 276 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied 39 U. S.
L. W. 3294 (U. S. Jan. 11, 1971).
s6 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236 (1955).
ST Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957).
s8 Washington Pro. Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n., 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.
D. N. Y. 1956).
9 Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. § 69, 106 (S. D. N. Y. 1958).
90 Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n. v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F. 2d 371 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 963 (1966).
91 Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n. of America, 358 F. 2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966),
rert. denied, 3S5 U. S. 846 (1966).
92 15 U. S. C. §§ 1921-94.
93 See 501 ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT A-10 (Feb. 23, 1971).
94 "The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state affairs."
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U. S. 200, 208 (1922).
(Continued on next page)
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court referred to congressional legislation as the means to subject
baseball to the Federal antitrust laws. 95 Because such legislation would
have to rest on congressional powers conferred by the commerce
clause, baseball would then have to be involved in interstate commerce
and there would be no logical basis for an exemption. Since baseball
is exempt from the antitrust laws, the reason may be found in a
reluctance to upset the internal mechanisms of an organization allowed
to develop with an immunity toward the antitrust laws.96 Another
reason for such exemption may simply be termed stare decisis.97
The problem of baseball's exemption may become moot by recent
introduction of bills in both the Senate and the House doing away
with baseball's special status. 98
b.) The Learned Professions. Another judicial exemption, if it can
be so classified, exists for the learned professions. The basis for such
exemption springs from a negative or reluctant application of the
"trade or commerce" element of the Sherman Act to the learned
professions.
It can be logically asserted that "trade or commerce" in the
Sherman Act is defined in accordance with the meaning given the
term at common law.99 In an early common-law decision, The Nymph.
rendered by Justice Story, "trade" excluded professions and the liberal
arts, 00 and Supreme Court cases have cited this language with ap-
(Continued from preceding page)
"The controlling consideration in Federal Baseball and Hart was, instead a very prac-
tical one-the degree of interstate activity involved in the particular business under
review."
United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U. S. 236, 243 (1955).
See also 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, 326-330,
§ 15.2 (h).
9 "We think that if there are evils in this field [baseball] which now warrant applica-
tion to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation."
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U. S. 356 (1953).
"But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball outside the scope of the Act. No
other business claiming the coverage of those cases has such an adjudication. We there-
fore conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there
be, is by legislation and not by court decision."
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957).
96 J. Eppel, Professional Sports, 33 A. B. A. ANTITRUST L. J. 69.
97 R. Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A. B. A. ANTITRUST SECTION
313 at 327.
9,See 458 ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT A-16 (April 21, 1970) for latest
legislative attempts to solve the problem.
99 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1910).
"It is certain that those terms at least in their rudimentary meaning, took their origin
in the common law, and were also familiar in the law of this country prior to and at
the time of the adoption of the act in question," at 51.
100,,... the word 'trade' is often and, indeed, generally used in a broader sense, as
equivalent to occupation, employment or business, whether manual or mercantile,
wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of
profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is
constantly called a trade."
The Nympth, 18 F. Cas. (No. 10,389) 506, 507 (C. C. Me. 1834).
Jan. 1972
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proval. 101 Thus, at least in dicta, the learned professions were immune
from antitrust violations.
102
In 1940, the appellate court for the District of Columbia in the
first American Medical Association case'0 3 held that the field of
medicine was trade and can be subjected to a "restraint of trade". In
the second A.M.A. case 104 the Supreme Court reserved decision on
the definition of trade to include medicine, 0 5 saying that if the pur-
pose and effect of the alleged conspiracy was a restraint of business
(i.e., a non-profit organization rendering group health services) this
was sufficient for an antitrust violation. The present posture of the
lower court decisions on this point are at variance. 0 6 Further, the
effect of state statutes declaring that professions are not trades con-
fuses the issue.107
The rationale afforded the professions for their special considera-
tion is vague. The Supreme Court noted that ethical considerations
of the relationships between patient and physician are quite different
from usual considerations involving ordinary commercial matters, 108
and that such forms of business competition may be demoralizing to
the ethical standards of a profession which would directly affect the
community. 109
The extent of the immunity given to the learned professions is
likewise vague. The Supreme Court has indicated that external
activities of a professional group as opposed to internal activities
receive different antitrust considerations." 0 Internal activities, such
as revoking membership, will be treated differently if membership
101 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435-36 (1931) ; United States
v. National Ass'n. Real Estate Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 490-91 (1949).
102 "Of course medical practitioners . . . follow a profession and not a trade, are not
engaged in the business of making or vending remedies but in prescribing them."
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 653 (1930).
103 United States v. American Medical Ass'n., 110 F. 2d 703 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 310 U. S. 644 (1940).
1'4 American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F. 2d 233 (D. C. Cir. 1942), aff'd 317
U. S. 519 (1943).
113 "Much argument has been addressed to the question whether a physician's practice of
his profession constitutes trade under § 3 of the Sherman Act. In the light of what we
shall say with respect to the charge laid in the indictment, we need not consider or
decide this question." Id. at 528.
Note that "trade" under a § 3 Sherman violation may be different than that for other
Sherman Act violations.
See Annot. 76 L. Ed. 1209.
"'American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 110 F. 2d 703 (D. C. Cir. 194-0), cert.
denied, 310 U. S. 644 (1940). (holding practice of medicine is trade) ; Marjorie Web-
ster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n. of C. & S. S., cert. denied, 400 U. S. 965 (hold-
ing education is not commerce) ; Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Med.
Ass'n., 310 F. Supp. 1016 (S. D. N. Y. 1970), (issue avoided).
107 E. g., California's Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 et seq. (West 1964).
See also Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons v. California Med. Ass'n., 36 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1964).
108 United States v. Oregon State Medical Ass'n., 343 U. S. 326 at 336 (1952).
109 Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of D. Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 at 612 (1934).
1n0 United States v. Oregon State Medical Ass'n., 343 U. S. 326 at 336 (1952).
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is mandatory by state regulation, than if membership is voluntary."'
The courts have always been reluctant to delve into internal opera-
tions of private associations, 12 and their reluctance will not be sig-
nificantly changed because of antitrust allegations. 113 External activi-
ties are different. Hence, an agreement among "learned professionals"
to fix commodity prices is an antitrust violation; 114 likewise, imposi-
tion of a boycott against fellow professionals is an antitrust viola-
tion.115
Finally, another reason for the exemption may be found in the
non-economic purpose of the learned professions. Briefly, there are
common-law decisions holding that such persons as clergymen and
educators, because of their status and non-commercial purpose, could
commit an unactionable restraint of trade. 1 6 Recently, this doctrine
is apparently finding its way into the antitrust cases. Probably, the
most noted case is Marjorie Webster Jr. Col. v. Middle States Assn'. of
C.&S.S.117 where plaintiff, a profit-making educational institution
alleged a conspiracy violation by defendant, a non-profit educational
corporation, for refusing plaintiff membership because plaintiff was
not a non-profit organization. On appeal, the court recognizing that
"lack of predatory intent is not conclusive . . . on antitrust liability,"
nevertheless held that the nature of defendant's activities "require
a finer analysis" and "absent an intent or purpose" to restrain trade,
the alleged conspiracy was at most an "incidental restraint of trade"
111 See Annor., at 336 (1952), 89 A. L. R. 2d 976; See Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1328; See also
recent Supreme Court cases, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 4-01 U. S. 1 (1971) ; In re
Stolar, 401 U. S. 23 (1971); Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S.
154 (1971) all turning on constitutional guarantees and due process considerations.
Note Justice Black's dissent in Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond at 771
"I must repeat once again that consistently with due process of law, no profession can
be turned over to the whim of their present or prospective competitors to determine
their right to practice.".
112 H. OLECK, supra note 24 at 371-382. See also Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n. of
America, 358 F. 2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) wherein membership rules were looked into for
reasonableness where golfer's livelihood depended on professional status.
113 First, for a Sherman Act violation, the interstate commerce requirement has to be
overcome which is difficult for an individual seeking membership in an association to
prove. See Riggal v. Washington County Medical Society, 249 F. 2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957)
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 954 (1958) ; Spears Free Clinic and Hospital for Poor Children
v. Cleere, 197 F. 2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952); Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson, 269
F. 2d 167 (8th Cir. 1959). Second, if a state antitrust action is asserted then the court
relies on a "hands off" policy. See Hubbard v. Medical Services Corp. of Spokane
County, 367 P. 2d 1003 (Wash. 1962) ; Washington Osteopathic Medical Ass'n. v. King
County Medical Service Corp., 495 ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORTER A-17
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1971).
114 See United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n., 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962) and
the reference made by the court to the proposition that if commodities were sold as part
and parcel of professional services the case would take a different complexion. See
also, Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n. v. United States, 306 F. 2d 379 (9th
Cir. 1962) for almost identical fact situation with the same holding.
115 Hubbard v. Medical Services Corp. of Spokane County, 367 P. 2d 1003 (Wash. 1962).
116 Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose-Sherman Act, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 705 (1962) ; Judi-
cial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1044 (1963).
117 Marjorie Webster Jr. Col. v. Middle States Ass'n. of C. & S. S., cert denied, 400 U. S.
965.
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not actionable under the Sherman Act." 8 On the state plane, a recent
Georgia decision held that a school board's action in excluding all but
one musical instrument store from participation in its band program
was, under the facts, not an abuse of discretion or violation of any
law.11
9
Antitrust Violation "Elements" Applied to Non-Profit Organizations
Because the antitrust laws are complex bodies of various statutory
laws, it is perhaps a misnomer to refer to "elements" of an antitrust
violation. Insofar as a Sherman § 1 violation is concerned, the activity
complained of must be (1) in interstate commerce; (2) a restraint of
trade (per se or rule of reason); and, (3) a contract, combination, or
conspiracy. 120 A similar breakdown exists for Sherman § 2 violations
dealing with monopoly.'
2
'
A. Interstate Commerce
Two tests are applied in determining if particular activity is
within interstate commerce. The first test defines interstate commerce
to embrace any activiy, including local activity, within the flow of
interstate commerce."? 2 The second test defines interstate commerce
to cover activity, including local activity, which has a substantial
effect on the flow of interstate commerce. 123 The two theories are
supposedly reconcilable by noting that they are additive in nature.
12 4
Of course interstate commerce is not applicable to state antitrust
violations. However, there currently does not appear to be any state
antitrust statutes mentioning or disclosing any application of anti-
trust violations to non-profit corporations.'2 5
B. Restraint of Trade
Unlike the learned professions exemption set forth above, it is
commonly agreed that non-profit organizations are engaged in trade
118 Note that the court arrived at this result by comparing the fact situation present to
that of labor unions apparently overlooking the fact that labor's exemption is granted
by federal statute.
119 Ken Stanton Music, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of Rome, (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1971)
506 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reporter A-7 (Mar. 30, 1971). One of complaint's
counts alleged monopoly.
1o0 J. VAN CISE, sutra note 7 at 29-34.
121 Id. at 34.
122 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U. S. 656 (1961); United
States v. Central States Theatre Corp., 187 F. Supp. 11 (D. Neb. 1960). (Both per se
violations).
123Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and Pro-
prietors Intern. Union of America, 195 F. Supp. 664 (W. D. Mo. 1961) af'd 301 F. 2d
443 (8th Cir. 1962); Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F. 2d 167 (8th Cir.
1959); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S. D. N. Y. 1963).
(All-not per se violations).
12- ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 23 at 39.
125 Research revealed only one antitrust state statute, REV. Cone WAsH. ANN. § 24.04.110
revoking a non-profit corporation's license if such corporation engaged in restraint of
trade. This statute was repealed by Laws ch. 235 § 100 p. 1202, ef. 7/1/69.
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or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act. 26 Hence, non-
profit institutions can engage in restraints of trade.
Again for simplicity, restraints of trade may be classified into
two categories, those that constitute per se violations (inherently
unlawful) and those that amount to violations by application of the
rule of reason. 127 Theoretically, the per se doctrine evolved from
application of the rule of reason to numerous, similar fact situations
involving the same restraints of trade amounting to antitrust viola-
tions.' What activities are currently deemed per se violations are
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that when clear per
se violations are found, the non-economic purposes of true non-profit
corporations will not serve as a defense." 9
The rule-of-reason application may be likened to a gradient. At
the top of the gradient are activities falling short of per se violations,
and at the bottom are activities clearly not amounting to restraints
of trade. Somewhere on this scale, the non-profit purpose will result
in some "reasonable" restraint of trade. Recent cases indicate that
the courts are taking a case-by-case approach to non-profit restraints
of trade, either harmonizing the restraint to the non-profit purpose or
disavowing the restraint from the non-profit purpose, and thereby
holding the restraint a violation. 30
126 Hazen v. National Rifle Ass'n. of Amer., 101 F. 2d 432 (D. C. Cir. 1938); Friends of
Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Med. Ass'n., 310 F. Supp. 1016 (S. D. N. Y.
1970) ; both holding non-profit concerns are engaged in trade. See also State of Mary-
land v. Wiltz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 833 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd 392 U. S. 183 (1968) and
cases cited therein holding that commerce includes non-profit organizations.
127 Rule of reason re-endorsed in The White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253
(1963); United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377 (1955) (but
not as to per se violations) ; United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960)
Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U. S. 207 (1959).
128 J. VAN CisE, supra note 7 at 122.
120 See Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W. D.
Mo. 1966) holding that fraternities being non-commercial organizations had no bearing
on trademark misuse antitrust charge; United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n.,
201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah 1962) non-economic purpose not applicable to price fixing;
Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920) non-
commercial purpose no defense to boycott; McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for
Decency Com., 374 F. 2d 359 (5th Cir. 1967) boycott for apparent non-commercial
purposes deemed violation.
13 See Application of American Society for Testing & Materials, 231 F. Supp. 686 (E. D.
Pa. 1968) holding that non-profit charitable organization did not violate antitrust laws
but that such organization could conceivably violate antitrust laws under different fact
situations; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Penn., 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.
D. Pa. 1969) holding that state's non-profit laws are silent on trade and therefore
alleged activities would have to be investigated; Marjorie Webster Jr. Col. v. Middle
States Ass'n. of C. & S. S., cert. denied, 400 U. S. 965 (1970) holding non-commercial
purpose justified incidental trade restraint; Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n. of
Amer., 358 F. 2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 846 (1966) holding that
membership denial in professional sports association was reasonable; STP Corp. v.
United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146 (S. D. Ind. 1968) no arbitrary abuse
of power found by non-profit rules making body.
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C. Contract, Combination, Etc.
Again, the scope of non-profit organizations and the antitrust laws
must necessarily limit the analysis to a general treatment of the
"step" which has resulted in a restraint of trade.
It should seem clear that non-profit status will not immunize
non-profit organizations from associations with profit business con-
cerns leading to violations of the antitrust laws. This necessarily
follows from the analysis of the agricultural cooperative and labor
union immunities which do not cover such situations.
Another area of' speculation lies in a monopolization charge
against a non-profit corporation. Because non-profit organizations
generally do not expand by merger or acquisition, such charge, if
made, would be based on a "natural" monopoly. This area is not
completely settled with respect to profit-going concerns; 131 it is cur-
rently unresolved with respect to the statutory exemption relating
to agricultural cooperatives,' 32 and it is suggested that non-profit
status would be placed somewhere in the middle with substantial
weight being given to the use of such monopoly power.1 33
VI. Trends
The subject of this paper is based on not one but two trends. The
first trend is the expansion of non-profit organizations into areas
traditionally thought of as profit-making businesses. The second trend
concerns the applicability of the antitrust laws to non-profit organ-
izations.
The exemption given non-profit organizations, if it can be called
such, applies to the traditional non-commercial purposes of such
organizations as a defense to antitrust charges based on the "rule of
reason".
Obviously, the weight given to such non-commercial purpose will
change when the nature of the organization changes from truly
"charitable" to simply "non-profit". The weight given to the non-
profit status should decrease when non-profit corporations become
involved with profit-making business entities, especially if such
profit-going concerns are subject to antitrust charges. Finally, no
effect at all should be given to alleged non-profit status of those "non-
profit" concerns that merely "utilize" liberal non-profit laws to in-
corporate in the form of non-profit concerns but for the real purpose
of financial gain.
Evaluation of the weight given to such considerations must await
case law development.
131 ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 23 at 35-36.
132 Authorities cited note 31 supra.
1" See weight given to such use of power in American Football League v. National Foot-
ball League, 323 F. 2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963); Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n. of
America, 358 F. 2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 846 (1966).
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